The economics, as the node encodes them.
Every number below is read from the node’s source at one commit, with the file and the line, and the constants the chain runs on are the release manifest’s, filled at build time (node 4cdcc488, read 8 October 2026, 17:2x UK). No price of IGN appears and nothing is projected: this page says what the code pays, to whom, and from what.
Source: the node fork at commit e0644958 (the devnet cut of 8 October 2026), confirmed by the node lane on 8 October 2026; every line number is that commit’s. The devnet runs the devnet parameters (consensus/core/src/config/params.rs 2173 and 2207).
Emission
The node defines the emission schedule in one struct (consensus/core/src/emission.rs 85 to 123) and installs it per network (params.rs 2158, 1910, 1764). A year is 31,557,600 seconds (emission.rs 32); the chain counts time in DAA seconds, one a block at one block a second.
| Field | CURRENT (the devnet today, mainnet) | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Launch rate | 31,688,087,810,000,000,000 base units a DAA second at 18 decimals (the literal 3,168,808,781 of emission.rs 104, 109 IGN x 108 / 31,557,600 floored, widened by rescaled(DEVNET_DECIMALS, EVM_DECIMALS) at emission.rs 129 in the devnet4 parameters: one billion IGN in year one, the same rate as mainnet) | emission.rs 85 to 123; igneum.rs 34 |
| Ramp | 2,592,000 s (30 days) from 10 percent | igneum.rs 76 launch_ramp |
| Step | 63,115,200 s (two years), the rate halved each step (decay 231 of 232) | emission.rs 85 to 123 |
| Tail | none: the curve runs to zero and the sum is the hard cap, 4,000,000,000 IGN | emission.rs 69 to 71 |
| Where each runs | The Igneum 2.0 devnet (18 decimals, the rescaled schedule); mainnet (18) | params.rs 2158, 1764 |
The schedule is a genesis parameter: the devnet digest does not move when a network installs another (params.rs 2095, the test). The live devnet’s block reward at its current DAA score is on the income page, computed from the CURRENT rule. What the chain paid at its first block, read back over the EVM RPC (TEAM-REPORTED, 8 October 2026, 17:14 UK; block 0xf3dc319c…, chain id 4465): 3.168808781 IGN in all at 18 decimals, 2.5350470248 IGN to the miner and 0.6337617562 IGN to the proving pool, the 80 / 20 split exact; the schedule’s launch rate of 31,688,087,810,000,000,000 base units a DAA second at the 10 percent ramp on second 0 gives the same 3,168,808,781,000,000,000 base units, climbing linearly to the full 31.688087810 IGN a block at DAA 2,592,000 (30 days at one block a second; block two already pays 3,168,819,784 base units more than block one); the miner’s balance read back over eth_getBalance confirms it: 2,535,047,024,800,000,000 wei after block one, 27,886,010,198,610,377,777 after block ten. The model’s operator simulation finds a fixed proving pool is a subsidy, not a price; the design behind proving_payment_activation_daa routes 90 percent of the user-paid proving base fee to the block’s provers at the congestion price and burns 10 percent, and it is designed and in the code behind its constant, not paid today.
Where a block’s coins go
| Share | Goes to | State | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| 80 percent | the miner whose key found the block | in consensus on every network | consensus/core/src/igneum.rs 44 (PROVING_POOL_SHARE_PERCENT = 20), applied at 87 and 202 |
| 20 percent | the proving pool, paid per shard to the provers of a segment record from a keyless escrow account | in consensus; the escrow is PROVING_POOL_ADDRESS in the execution layer | igneum.rs 44; igneum/exec/src/config.rs |
| A silent block’s bonus | a slice of the producer’s share moved to the pool when the producer did not sign its checkpoints, nothing destroyed | designed and in the code, not active: signing_bonus_activation_daa is u64::MAX on every object | igneum.rs 96 silent_split; params.rs 1717 |
| 0 | any team, foundation, fund or treasury | no such output exists in the subsidy and no protocol tip reaches any address | igneum.rs; spec 05 section 5.5 |
Where fees go
| Route | What happens | State | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base fee, execution gas | burned in full: gas used times the execution base fee, debited and credited to no one | in the code on the devnet | igneum/exec/src/executor.rs 320 to 371 (327 and 357, 328 and 360) |
| Priority fee (the tip) | 80 percent to the block’s miner; 20 percent to the developer registrations of the contracts whose code ran, pro rata by each frame’s gas; an unregistered frame’s part is credited to nobody, which is a burn | in the code on the devnet | executor.rs 335 to 339; igneum/exec/src/pgas.rs 290; igneum/exec/src/config.rs 76 (DEVELOPER_SHARE_PERCENT = 20) |
| The proving payment | pgas used times the proving base fee, the congestion price of proving capacity: 90 percent to the block’s proving pool, paid per shard to its provers by consensus proving cost; 10 percent burned | designed, in the code behind the constant (Params::proving_payment_activation_daa, never on every object, on the fork branch proving-payment); the shard guest’s mirror of the split is owed before any height; on the 2.0 devnet the proving charge burns in full | spec 05 sections 5.1 and 5.3; docs/design/proving-payment.md (8 October 2026) |
| External proving jobs | 90 percent to the provers who delivered, 10 percent burned, once jobs settle in IGN | designed, not in the code: no constant exists; at launch a job is paid on the customer’s own chain | spec 05 section 5.4; the litepaper’s Proving section |
| The provers’ part of the tip | none: no part of the tip reaches the provers; the tip stays whole to the block (spec O-5.7 closed at zero, 8 October 2026) | in the code | docs/design/proving-payment.md; executor.rs 335 to 339 |
The proving-fee market
A card’s second income is the proving pool: 20 percent of every block, paid per shard against a valid proof record, plus 90 percent of every block’s proving payment, which users pay at the congestion price of proving capacity (designed; on the devnet that payment is still burned in full). Nothing from the priority fee, which stays whole to the block. The reason the design routes the proving charge to the provers: the operator simulation reads a fixed internal pool as a subsidy, not a price, and only the congestion-priced user-funded fee restores service after a lasting proving spike (35 periods against never; modelled). The price a prover must charge an outside customer is the subsidy it forgoes while it proves, which falls as one over the network’s hash rate; the market itself is designed and not built. The hard cap and the absence of any development fund are unchanged.
The client fee and the fund it fills
| Item | What | Where |
|---|---|---|
| The dev fee | Ember, the official miner, requests one block template in a hundred with the dev payout address instead of yours: 1 percent, a counter, not a draw; off with --dev-fee 0, the switch in the app or DEV_FEE=0 on HiveOS; none in pool mode, where the pool issues the templates | igneum/miner/src/main.rs 718 (DEV_FEE_DEFAULT_PERCENT = 1), 712 (the release address), 716 (the devnet address) |
| What it is | the software’s fee, never the protocol’s: any other client is welcome and pays nothing | the dev fee page |
| The fund it fills | the IGN the dev fee collects goes to Igneum Labs, the company that ships the software; that is the fund the grants are paid from. The protocol carries no fund and no grant is paid from emission | the grants page |
Who pays for proving
Three incomes, kept apart. Each has its own source and its own state.
| Income | Where it comes from | Who gets it | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block security | the block subsidy (80 percent of each block) and 80 percent of the priority fee | the miner whose key found the block | in consensus on every network (measured) |
| Internal proving | the proving pool: a fifth of each block’s subsidy (20 percent), paid per shard against a valid proof record; nothing else pays an internal prover today | the prover keys that delivered the shards | in consensus on the devnet (measured below); the provers’ part of the tip designed, not in the code |
| External customers | payments from other chains for proofs, settled in IGN: 90 percent to the provers, 10 percent burned | the provers who took the job | designed, not implemented: no constant exists, no job has been paid |
The proving base fee pays nobody. A transaction’s pgas times the proving base fee is burned in full today (executor.rs, the base-fee row above). It is not a prover’s income and it does not fill the pool. The pool is filled by the subsidy alone, and the subsidy halves every two years.
What the pool pays, measured (a disrupted record, not a benchmark)
The reading below is the earlier devnet’s 24-hour window of 8 October 2026, a disrupted record and not a benchmark; the benchmark is the two-hour hold on the 2.0.2 build when it runs, and any latency or energy figure served from it includes the unsuccessful jobs. On the devnet in the 24 hours to 12:16 UK on 8 October 2026: 8,209 shards paid, 9,913.09 IGN in all, to 29 prover keys; 40,502 shards planned, so about a fifth of the planned shards were proven and paid and the rest left their credit in the escrow; 905 shards paid in the last hour; the lag from a proven block to the block that pays p50 514 and p90 953 DAA seconds. Per shard paid that is about 1.21 IGN; per key about 12 shards and 14 IGN an hour averaged over the day, across keys that prove at very different rates (measured; the observer’s proof tables through /api/explorer?proving=1).
What reaches provers under the schedule, modelled
Low fees and no external demand, which is the chain today: the pool is a fifth of the subsidy and nothing else. The table holds today’s shard count and key count constant and walks the halvings. No price of IGN appears; whether a row covers a card’s electricity depends on the price, which this page does not state.
| When | Subsidy per block, IGN | Pool per block, IGN | Pool per day, IGN | Per planned shard, IGN | Per prover key per hour, IGN | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Today, inside the launch ramp | 3.169 | 0.634 | 54,757 | 1.35 | 78.7 | DAA 0, 10.0 percent of the full rate; modelled; the measured payout is in the row above |
| Full rate (years 1 to 2) | 31.688 | 6.338 | 547,570 | 13.52 | 786.7 | period 0 of the schedule; from day 30 |
| After the first halving (years 3 to 4) | 15.844 | 3.169 | 273,785 | 6.76 | 393.4 | period 1 of the schedule |
| After the second (years 5 to 6) | 7.922 | 1.584 | 136,893 | 3.38 | 196.7 | period 2 of the schedule |
| After the third (years 7 to 8) | 3.961 | 0.792 | 68,446 | 1.69 | 98.3 | period 3 of the schedule |
| After the fourth (years 9 to 10) | 1.981 | 0.396 | 34,223 | 0.84 | 49.2 | period 4 of the schedule |
| After the fifth (years 11 to 12) | 0.990 | 0.198 | 17,112 | 0.42 | 24.6 | period 5 of the schedule |
Modelled from emission.rs (the schedule as site/lib/emission.mjs carries it) and the release manifest at build time, with today's measured shard count (40,502 planned in 24 hours) and key count (29) held constant; the per-shard figure is the pool's credit per planned shard, the per-key figure the pool per day divided by the keys and by 24. More shards or more keys lower both; a block's unproven shards leave their credit in the escrow.
Per card, per hour, now and at each halving
A card’s proving income is its shards times the credit per shard. Measured rates: an RTX 5090 proves an empty live shard beside its miner in 7.0 to 7.7 s and a full shard in 10.9 s alone, about 37 s a shard end to end (export, cut, key set-up, prove, sign, submit), 1.4 shards a minute; an RTX 3060 (12 GB) proves the v1 shard beside its miner in 37.5 s; an RTX 4060 (8 GB) proves it alone in 18.4 s (measured 4 to 6 October 2026; the measurement record in the repository, docs/bench-log.md). At those rates one card can prove 80 to 100 shards an hour, more than the 905 an hour the whole chain paid to 29 keys, so today a prover is limited by the shards on offer, not by its card: the hourly figure per key in the table is the ceiling an evenly shared pool gives, and a 5090 and a 3060 take the same credit per shard. At each halving the credit per shard halves with the pool; a card’s watts do not. (Modelled from the measured rates; the chain’s shard count is the real limit.)
Two honest routes to sustain it
| Route | What it does | What it is worth | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| A defined share of fees to the proving pool | a fixed percentage of the base fees burned today (both gas dimensions) credited to the pool instead, by a rule at genesis or a class change | each percent of the share adds one percent of the day’s burned base fees to the pool. Priced per unit, not predicted: at 100,000 IGN of base fees burned in a day (a hypothetical volume, not a forecast) a 10 percent share adds 10,000 IGN a day, about today’s measured payout; at the devnet’s fee volume today it adds almost nothing, because almost nothing is burned | designed as an option; no constant exists |
| External settlement in IGN | other chains pay for proofs in IGN; 90 percent to the provers, 10 percent burned | the price a prover must charge is the subsidy it forgoes while it proves: per shard, (card hash ÷ network hash) × 0.8 × the block subsidy × shard seconds. For an RTX 5090 at 136 MH/s on a 1 GH/s network and a 37 s shard that is about 16 IGN a shard inside the ramp today and about 128 IGN at the full rate, against the pool’s 1.2 IGN a shard measured; the quote falls as one over network hash and is competitive near 100 GH/s (the litepaper, Building on Igneum) | designed; the settlement contract is not built |
The standard’s new-entry test, as found
ECO-05: FAIL. ECO-05, the standard’s coexistence sweep, was run on a register frozen before any result against a sourced revenue reference of USD 31.65 million a year of miner revenue (Ethereum Classic’s trailing year at its current era 6 reward) and FAILS the envelope as the chain stands. Of sixteen revenue and tariff worlds (a quarter, one, four and ten times the reference; electricity at 3, 10, 25 and 40 cents per kilowatt-hour) one sustains new entry across two vendors on the measured cards, ten times the reference at 3 cents (about USD 316 million a year), and a second, ten times the reference at 10 cents, on the RX 7600’s modelled efficiency point, which the metered row due in the morning keeps at or below 5.4 microjoules per hash and takes away above about 5.6; the cause is that on this hash the measured AMD and Intel cards cost four to six times a Blackwell card per joule and never earn a new entrant’s purchase back at list price below those worlds; the verdict is FAIL either way; in those worlds no specialised design sits inside the envelope against the whole cohort (the board on commodity DRAM is within the envelope only against the best Blackwell card, the die and the hybrid against no card of today’s), and the quarter-reference worlds at 25 and 40 cents are collapse worlds with no rational profitable operator. What moves the result is the specialist’s hardware cost per unit of work, the honest cards’ own efficiency on this hash, above all the AMD and Intel cards’ energy, and the dataset’s size floor; not a smaller network, a higher token price or any chip’s death. Reported as found; the register, the full result cube and the model are published for independent reproduction. (Labels: the register frozen at 18:37 UK on 8 October 2026, the reference corrected by a second public read and the run repeated with the verdict unchanged, the cube MODELLED on measured card rows, two cohort rows BLOCKED, the RX 7600’s knee and the Arc’s watts, their measurement running tonight; the registry row ECO-05 on /acceptance; the results file docs/analysis/class-v6/eco-05-results.md.)
The chip question (whether a chip gets built against the hash, and what it would earn) is a conditional argument of its own on the litepaper’s chip model, not part of this page.
Units and decimals
| Network | Consensus side | EVM side | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Igneum 2.0 devnet | 18 decimals (base units of 10-18 IGN) | 18 decimals, one to one | params.rs 2120; consensus/core/src/unit.rs; igneum/exec/src/config.rs 51 |
| Mainnet | 18 decimals | 18 decimals | params.rs 1724 |
The symbol is IGN on every network. A wallet shows 18 decimals everywhere; the 2.0 devnet pays in 18, one to one (an earlier devnet paid in 8 through a bridge of 1010); the same amount at 18.
What this page does not do
It names no price and models no market; the proving model above walks the subsidy schedule at today’s measured shard and key counts and states no price. The income page turns these rules into IGN a day for a card you pick, and money a day only at a price you type. Devnet IGN has no value.
Not legal advice.